



The Situation in Afghanistan
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The United States and the entire world, most especially the reuniting halves of Europe, owe a tremendous debt to the people of Afghanistan. Their sacrifice of over a million lives and of what little wealth this desperately poor country had was an important factor in the Soviet government's re-evaluation of the effectiveness of the use of military force in resolving international conflicts. The bravery of the Afghan mujahedin has severely damaged the prestige of the Soviet military and the conservative factions within the Communist Party of the USSR. Withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan has so far been the main benefit the people of the Soviet Union themselves have derived from Gorbachev's program.

Hence I believe that the U.S. and the entire world owes a debt to the people of Afghanistan that will not be easy to repay. Despite the confusing and frustrating situation in that country today, it would be wrong simply to end our involvement and effectively abandon Afghanistan to fragmentation and civil war. The country requires the help of the U.S. and the international community, first, to exercise self-determination and thus make peace, and, second, to rebuild itself. Both these processes may require years of commitment.

The nature of that commitment, however, must change, as the situation in Afghanistan, the region, and the world has changed. A strategy which succeeded in the past -- supplying more and more sophisticated weapons through exiled leaders in Pakistan to uncoordinated resistance fronts inside the country -- will lead our policy, as well as Afghanistan, to disaster. Any attempt to use continued aid to force the Afghans into one or another form of "unity" made in Washington, Islamabad, or Riyadh, will fail as

¹All views expressed herein are those of the author alone, not those of the United States Institute of Peace.

ignominiously as the AIG is failing -- or as the PDPA's made-in-Moscow "unity" is failing.

American policy toward Afghanistan is undergoing some gradual evolution in a positive direction, but it retains some fundamental flaws.

First, the policy is confused in its goals: our principle objective was accomplished with the departure of Soviet troops, and we have been unable to articulate clearly what our remaining objectives are.

Second, the policy is based on a mistaken conceptual framework derived from an outdated image of bi-polar conflict both within Afghanistan and in the international system over Afghanistan. In reality there are multiple forces involved at both levels.

Third, the policy is inconsistent in its execution. Partly because the conflict is complex and multilateral, partly because the policy is executed by operational agencies whose goals may differ from the stated policies of their governments, and partly because there is no unified political leadership of the resistance, neither we nor anyone else can coordinate military activity of the mujahedin with political objectives, which Clausewitz singled out as the major determinant of success in war.

Judging by the questions I was asked to address, some of the originators of this hearing share the predominant misconceptions. My letter of invitation asked me to address two themes: "Continued Soviet troop and force deployment in Afghanistan, and the continued violation of human rights in that country." Behind these questions apparently lie two beliefs: that the reason the mujahedin have not triumphed by capturing Kabul and setting up a new government is that Soviet troops are still supporting the government in Kabul, and that the government is still successfully engaged in ruthless repression. Of these two assertions, the former is false, and the latter a half-truth; most important, the real reasons for the evolution of the political and military stalemate lie elsewhere.

In brief, for many Afghans, including mujahedin, the war is no longer a jihad between two starkly opposed sides, but a struggle for power among self-interested actors supported by a variety of foreign powers, not only the US and USSR, but also Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, and Libya. This trend has become accentuated since the failed coup d'état of March 6. This coup ended in a de facto

alliance between, on the one side, the most extreme factions formerly supported by both the USSR and the US (PDPA-Khalq and Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar)), together with the Pakistani intelligence services, and, on the other side, Najibullah's regime, tacitly supported against the Hekmatyar-Tanai alliance by most of the mujahedin.² Both the US and the USSR emerged as relatively marginal actors in this conflict that they are doing so much to fund.

Goals

Our goal should be a political settlement in which Afghans choose their own leaders without any conditions set by outsiders; Afghanistan becomes a neutral buffer state; and all foreign powers cease to supply weapons or engage in covert operations. Only insofar as such moves promote such a settlement do we have an interest in removing Najibullah or the PDPA or in strengthening the AIG or any other specific organization. Such a settlement would also be most likely to meet the legitimate interests of Pakistan by encouraging refugee repatriation and reconstruction.

There is some evidence, however, that powerful actors with whom we are allied, and perhaps some within our own government, have other goals, goals which require not the free choice of Afghans but the installation or at least continued supply of particular groups. Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, continues to speak of the Afghan fundamentalist groups as useful for the liberation of Soviet Central Asia. He said as much to Undersecretary of State Robert Kimmitt a few months ago. Saudi Arabia continues to favor militant Sunni fundamentalists over a more broad-based leadership of the resistance in order to counter the influence of Iran and advance its own agenda within the Islamic world; and some in the U.S. government have claimed to me, although I cannot verify it, that some of their colleagues regard Afghanistan in part as a

²According to resistance sources, during the coup mujahedin in Qandahar offered prayers for the welfare of Najibullah. Both Pashtun mujahedin of Hezb-e Islami (Khales) based in Paghman and Tajik mujahedin of Jamiat-e Islami based in Kohdaman blocked some of the approaches to Kabul during the coup attempt to stop attempted advances by the Hekmatyar-Tanai forces. The six remaining parties affiliated to the AIG in Peshawar also opposed the coup. Najibullah later publicly thanked the mujahedin for their assistance. The motivation of the mujahedin, of course, was not to help Najibullah, whom they still do not recognize, but to stop Hekmatyar.

potential base for operations affecting future struggles in Iran and Central Asia.

Those who support such goals have an interest in continuing the war, not just until the Afghan people can exercise self-determination, but until particular groups they favor take power. They oppose not only the regime in Kabul, but an indigenous nationalist alternative to that regime. Such goals are part of the reason there has been so much resistance to broadening the political base of the mujahedin leadership. The U.S. government, and first of all the president, must clearly state in public and, most important, in private, that such schemes are not in the interest of the U.S. or, for that matter, the Afghans. We must use all our influence to stop those who are ostensibly on our side from pursuing them. Only then will we be in a position to offer a genuine alternative to the Soviets and find out how far they will go to pry their clients loose from the Afghan state.

Conceptual Framework

The debate about policy in Afghanistan continues to unfold within a bi-polar conceptual framework derived from the Cold War, which is true to the realities of neither Afghanistan nor the contemporary international system.

According to this framework, there are two sides in Afghanistan: the Communist government, supported by the Soviet Union, and the patriotic, Islamic resistance, supported by the U.S. and its allies. The reality is different. There are not two but many sides in Afghanistan. The country has indeed undergone a certain ideological polarization, but even more fundamental, and becoming stronger since the Soviet troop withdrawal, is that it has undergone a process of tribal, ethnic, sectarian, political, geographical, economic, urban/rural, cultural, and generational fragmentation. The coup attempt of March 6 illustrated both that this fragmentation continues within the Kabul regime as well as the resistance, and that tribal-ethnic ties can outweigh ideology among even the most ideological segments of the population.

A military solution cannot work not only because neither side can defeat the other, but, more fundamentally, because there are not two sides one or the other of which could win; a victory by any of the many contending forces would provoke a civil war on the part of those who are excluded.

Similarly, a political settlement cannot develop out of negotiations between two sides. A political settlement could only develop out of a process similar to a round table, or in Afghan terms, a shura or jirga.

The same is true at the international level. There are five nations with different interests and perspectives actively involved in the supply of weapons to various factions in Afghanistan: the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Libya is also supplying millions of dollars in cash to Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), and India provides key technical assistance to the government, especially the air force. The policy which is supposedly *ours*, of supporting the mujahedin, is coming increasingly under the influence of Saudi Arabia, which now pays for over 60 percent of the arms.

Although we have been cooperating with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, these two countries' intelligence agencies, as well as the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, have very different interests in Afghanistan than we do. Their attempts to manipulate the resistance are bitterly resented by many Afghans, who wonder why the U.S. permits such actions. Iran shared our interest in the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but since last summer it has clearly shown that it prefers the continued power of Najibullah to the installation of a Sunni fundamentalist government backed by Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Ironically, it has improved its relations with the moderate Sunni groups, even the supporters of Zaher Shah, out of fear of the Saudi-supported Sunni fundamentalists. There is a danger of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan.

Means

The current policy also cannot succeed because we do not have the means to carry it out. For instance, we have rightly protested against the imbalance resulting from the USSR's massive supplies of sophisticated weapons to the Kabul regime. Until now, however, we have virtually ignored Soviet offers to negotiate a withdrawal of the stockpiles that create the imbalance.³ Instead we have tried to

³There have been a number of statements by Soviet officials indicating that they might be willing to negotiate the withdrawal of weapons stockpiles as part of an agreement on negative symmetry -- an arrangement which has come to be known as "negative symmetry plus." For instance, according to an article in the Washington Post of July 19, 1989, in an interview with reporter James Rupert, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov "repeated the

balance the Soviet supplies with new supplies to the mujahedin. Since November we have allocated \$280 million from the U.S. and \$435 million from Saudi Arabia.

The fact is, however, that these arms do not go to "one side," balancing the supplies on the "other side." They are distributed by the Pakistani ISI and the Saudis largely in accord with their own criteria, which often contribute to divisions among mujahedin. I might add that all the talk from Washington and Islamabad about trying to unite the mujahedin applies at best to the attempt to create a united front in Peshawar. Inside Afghanistan these pronouncements are blatantly contradicted by the actions of the operational officers who use the distributions of weapons to break commanders off from large mujahedin organizations on order to pressure them into carrying out military plans conceived by Pakistan or the U.S. (This is known as "subcontracting.") One result of this is that in late February, after over three months of this resupply effort, a regime convoy successfully reached Khost, one of the easiest areas to supply from Pakistan. When Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, no land convoy had been able to reach Khost without a major offensive. The effect of divisively distributed weapons supplies has been to demoralize, not strengthen, the mujahedin.

Politically, we have been committed to "broadening the base of the AIG." At the ministerial meetings in Moscow we even offered the Soviets a broadened AIG in a first stage if they would agree to remove Najibullah in a second stage. Since the Tanai coup attempt, however, the AIG has virtually collapsed.

In sum, we have neither the military nor political means to carry out our stated policy.

Soviet offer to negotiate a cutoff of the arms flow to both sides and said Moscow would consider in principle removing weapons already supplied to Kabul." [My emphasis.] In an article containing a proposal for an Afghan settlement which appeared in *Izvestia* on February 14, 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze wrote: "One of the key issues on which it would be desirable to reach international consensus is complete termination of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, no matter where they come from, along with announcing a break or suspension of hostilities. . . . In order to support measures to fully stop arms deliveries, it would be reasonable to discuss the removal from Afghanistan of all weapon stockpiles and not to deliver them to that country in the future." [My emphasis.]

An Alternative: A Strategy for a Political Settlement

The goal of American policy should not be to arm the resistance to "overthrow" the Najibullah regime. There is no single politically organized resistance that could replace it. Instead we must combine whatever military pressure we can bring to bear with negotiations to bring about a genuine act of self-determination by the people of Afghanistan.

Najibullah and the Soviet Union have repeatedly stated that they will accept the results of elections. Events in Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and inside the Soviet Union itself make such assurances worthy of serious exploration in tough negotiations, even though they could justifiably have been dismissed before. Our goal should be to negotiate conditions under which the people of Afghanistan can take part in a genuine representative process, with a minimum of outside pressures and no preconditions. This process could be an election, a shura, a Loya Jirga, or some combination -- that should be a matter for Afghans. Moderate resistance leader Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, president of the largely defunct AIG, but still an important personality, recently endorsed the concept of elections to a Loya Jirga monitored by a commission jointly approved by both sides, provided that it was preceded by the departure of Najibullah from office. He even said Najibullah could participate in the elections "if he becomes a good Moslem."⁴

⁴The following is a partial text of a Reuters report from Peshawar, April 24, 1990: "Afghan guerrilla leader Sibghatullah Mojadidi hinted on Tuesday that mujahideen Moslem fighters might be prepared to compromise with the Soviet-backed government in Kabul over a political settlement.

"Mojadidi, president of the Afghan rebel government in exile, told a news conference that if he were sincere about peace, president Najibullah should step down before elections.

"If this becomes reality, a joint commission from both sides can be appointed to do the needful," he said.

"Up to now the guerrillas based in Pakistan have adamantly refused any deal with Najibullah, but Mojadidi said: 'If he becomes a good Moslem then we will allow him to participate in the elections.'

"The United States and the Soviet Union, the main backers of the two sides in the Afghan conflict, have been talking about an interim commission that would organize elections but have become stuck on whether Najibullah should have any role.

"The United States and the Afghan mujahideen want him to step down at the beginning of any peace process while Moscow is insisting he remain in power while elections are organized.

This means, first, that as long as we are providing weapons, we should make every effort to see that they go to forces that support genuine self-determination. In particular, the long-standing alliance between our CIA and the Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies ought to be broken, unlikely as this is in view of our other priorities in the region. Both of these agencies are pursuing independent sectarian or political goals in Afghanistan, sometimes with our resources. Our aid should go to political forces inside Afghanistan who have shown themselves capable of unity and popular support, such as Massoud's Council of the North and the shura of mujahedin of Qandahar. If the current efforts by Massoud, Abdul Haq, and others to constitute an independent military council of commanders succeeds, then this body should be the main one with which we deal. (We should be very wary of ISI-sponsored efforts to establish a Pakistan-based council of Peshawar-based "commanders.")

Frankly, however, I have the greatest skepticism as to whether the United States has the capacity or will to do this. Continuing to supply weapons through the same channels, which have largely been controlled by the Pakistani ISI, will not strengthen the resistance but divide and weaken it. Weapons do not win battles, motivated, well-organized fighters do. Hence, while I urge that immediate efforts be directed to changing the supply channels, in the medium term I support the cessation of all arms supplies to Afghanistan as an early step in a political settlement.

The components of a political settlement such as is being discussed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could be the following: The U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly announce that there is no single legitimate authority in Afghanistan and hence call on the international community and especially the Islamic world to provide assistance to the Afghans in constituting such an authority. To implement such a proposal, they ask the U.N. Secretary General's Office and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to accelerate their existing consultations with all Afghan parties to establish a group of prominent Afghans to oversee some representational

"Mojadidi confirmed that the guerrilla leadership was discussing proposals for internationally supervised elections to a Loya Jirga, a traditional grand council, in both government-held and mujahideen-held areas. . . .

"Under the plan being promoted by moderate guerrilla leader Syed Ahmad Gailani, the jirga would draft a new constitution and organise general elections."

process.³ The U.N. is already in contact with many such people, such as the former king, Zaher Shah, Abdul Sattar Sirat, a former Justice Minister and Islamic scholar now in Saudi Arabia, former deputy Prime Minister Samad Hamed, and others. The National Salvation Society (see below) could also play an important role, as could the council of commanders, if it is formed. The minimal responsibility of this group would be to organize the elections. It might also have the responsibility of overseeing security.

The U.N. and the OIC should also constitute an international body, with a strong Islamic participation from countries such as Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia who have not been involved in the conflict, to monitor the fairness of the elections. This body could be modelled on the experiences of Namibia and Nicaragua. Once these bodies begin functioning and all parties have committed themselves to respecting the outcome of the process, all weapons supplies should be cut off to all sides. As a confidence-building measure, the Soviets should withdraw SCUD missiles and perhaps MiG-29s from Afghanistan at the beginning of the process. Furthermore, the international community should pledge a large amount of financial and other support for reconstruction to whatever government emerges from this process.

All internal Afghan questions, such as control over the security apparatus, the degree of participation in the elections (in particular the participation of the PDPA, Najibullah, or other specific personalities) should be left to the Afghan body and its consultations with all parties.

I will now address the two questions mentioned in my invitation. I will then offer a broader analysis of the background of the current situation and further comments on my own policy recommendations.

³One may call this process "elections" as a form of shorthand, but it will probably not take the exclusive form of secret balloting by individuals, a method which is a departure from Afghan traditions and which requires a degree of administrative control that does not now exist in many parts of the country.

According to Xinhua, Islamabad, April 26, President Mojadidi "said the proposal for holding elections in PDPA-controlled areas under the supervision of the United Nations and in mujahideen-controlled areas under the supervision of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was being considered by the AIG, but no decision had been taken yet."

Continued Soviet Troop Deployment in Afghanistan

There is no credible evidence of continuing Soviet troop deployment in Afghanistan after February 15, 1989, the date set for the end of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. There may have been some relatively minor infringements, but, even if these thus far unproven charges prove true, they are not the reason for the present situation.

Since there are apparently no Russian or Slavic soldiers in Afghanistan, charges have been made that some units fighting on the side of the Afghan government composed of members of ethnic groups (Uzbeks and Tajiks) that are also present in Soviet Central Asia are actually Soviet troops in Afghan uniform. The major such unit is the Jawzjani militia. The available evidence indicates that far from being Soviet troops in Afghan uniforms the Jawzjanis are Uzbeks from Afghanistan in Soviet uniforms. An unclassified report prepared for the CIA by a highly regarded group of researchers stated, as part of its analysis of regime deployments in the Qandahar area:

In the Qandahar area . . . the best Afghan [government] soldiers were probably the Russian-officered and uniformed Uzbek Militia Brigade from Jowzjan, reportedly composed of some 700 Uzbek tribesmen. Resistance sources claim that it was withdrawn along with the [Soviet] 70th Motor Rifle Brigade and was temporarily sent back to Jowzjan. However, when the situation became critical in October 1988, the brigade was airlifted back in. Due to their Russian style uniforms they were mistaken for Soviet troops.⁶

The Jawzjanis are one of many militias, often consisting of former resistance fighters, who have joined the government out of a variety of motives: resentment at manipulation by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, desire for arms and money in order to compete with traditional rivals who have gained the same resources from resistance organizations, or kinship ties to prominent individuals in the government. In a previous debate with Rosanne Klass, a proponent of the thesis that these Jawzjanis were KGB border guards, I described the basis of recruitment of the Jawzjanis:

Klass makes a number of claims about the secret introduction of Soviet troops and militia. The only specific case she mentions is the Jawzjani

⁶Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces. The Orkand Corporation, April 1989, p. 158.

militia in Qandahar. She claims that "Jawzjani" means "Mongol," which is wrong. Jawzjan is a province of northern Afghanistan having a border with Soviet Uzbekistan. The peasant population is mostly Uzbek and Tajik, but the landlords in the area are mostly Durrani Pashtuns (members of the same tribal confederation as the Afghan kings). Anthropologists have found that this was one of the few regions of Afghanistan where significant economic and social inequality coincided with an ethnic cleavage. They found considerable resentment among Uzbek and Tajik peasants of the Durrani Pashtun *khaens*.⁷

Hence it is not at all unthinkable, given that this flat area has been under consistent Soviet control since 1980, that the Soviets have managed to organize some Uzbeks and Tajiks of Jawzjan into an anti-Durrani militia.⁸ This militia has been sent to Qandahar, the center of the Durrani Pashtuns, where the Jawzjanis have committed acts of great cruelty. According to reports, the militia has very poor, even hostile, relations with the local party and army organizations, which are also Pashtun. "For this reason," Naim Majrooh writes, "the Russians are trying to reduce the number of the militiamen in Kandahar."^{9,10}

There were equally questionable reports that Soviet planes helped Najibullah during the March coup d'état. Sources in the administration have informed me that there is no intelligence supporting such assertions. There have been occasional reports by defectors or by resistance commanders that Soviet pilots are flying Afghan air force planes, that Soviet planes have crossed the border to participate in fighting in Northern Afghanistan, or that Soviet advisors are helping to fire SCUD missiles. Such charges should be investigated and, if found to be true, protested vigorously. If the Jawzjanis are still deployed with Soviet officers (not much has been

⁷Richard Tapper, "Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Intergroup Conflict in North-Central Afghanistan," in M. Nazir Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, eds., Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1984), pp. 230-246.

⁸The Orkand Corporation's study of Northern Afghanistan reports (p. 187) that after the Soviet invasion Uzbeks in that region received land previously held by Pashtuns. This naturally would make them loyal to whoever gave them the land. (This footnote was not in the original.)

⁹Naim Majrooh, "Special Report from Kandahar and Helmand," Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, December 1988, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰The above excerpt, including the footnotes, is from "Correspondence," Orbis 33 (Spring 1989), p. 278. The section also includes Klass's comments on a previous article of mine.

heard of them lately), this should also be protested. None of these charges, however, even if found to be valid, has much to do with the current trends inside Afghanistan.

Human Rights

I am the author or co-author of many reports on human rights in Afghanistan, which are the major English-language sources for those who wish to document the atrocities committed by the Soviets and the Kabul regime.¹¹ Today the Kabul regime has largely ceased offensives in rural areas, but the firing of SCUD missiles has killed hundreds or thousands of civilians. These weapons are only accurate within a mile of the target and carry a payload of 1000 kg. More of them have been fired in Afghanistan in the past 18 months than in the entire war between Iran and Iraq.

In Kabul, WAD (the Ministry of State Security, or secret police) continues to spread fear, and the press and public life are still largely, though not entirely, controlled by the Party. Arrests are fewer than in the past. It is not so dangerous to speak privately against the government. The once omnipresent indoctrination in Marxism-Leninism has been greatly reduced or even eliminated. The PDPA has been affected by the fates of ruling Communist Parties elsewhere in the world.

Some prisoners are still tortured, but, from the small evidence I have, it seems that it is no longer standard practice to do so in all cases. Over 600 people were arrested after the March 6 coup attempt, and some executions have already been reported. Prison conditions have improved. The ICRC has access to many prisons, which it was denied for years. I know of several cases where missing persons have been located in Kabul prisons by the ICRC.

Most important for the future of a peace process, the government is beginning to tolerate some pluralism of opinion, and it is promising to do more. Najibullah has recently written hundreds of letters to prominent Afghan exiles, promising toleration of diverse opinions and an end to the monopoly of power. One such letter was

¹¹These include: (with Jeri Laber) A Nation is Dying: Afghanistan under the Soviets, 1979-1987 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988), and two reports for Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch, Tears, Blood, and Cries (1984, with Jeri Laber), and To Die in Afghanistan (1985).

published in the Afghan magazine published in California, Aineh-ye Afghanistan. One prominent Afghan who was a delegate to the resistance shura in Rawalpindi in February 1989 described the letter by saying, "I could have written it myself." Najibullah, in a pledge that has yet to be tested, has offered to accept the results of elections, as did the Communist leaders in most Eastern European countries and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

More important than words, however, are deeds. It remains disturbing that, according to Amnesty International, the Afghan Government arrested and imprisoned the founding members of a new party, the National Unity Party, in June 1989. Some of those arrested are listed in an Amnesty International Urgent Action of January 1990, which I have included as an appendix.

On the other side is an event whose importance can hardly be exaggerated: the founding on September 9, 1989, of the National Salvation Society (NSS) in Kabul. This organization has continued to function openly in Kabul and can be reached at the Afghan Tour Hotel there. Its members are former officials of the Royal Government of Afghanistan who have remained in Kabul but have never collaborated in any way with the regime or the Soviets. Indeed, freedom from the taint of such collaboration is a condition for membership. The NSS is chaired by Dr. Mohammad Asghar, a graduate of the University of Illinois (B.A., B.S.) and Columbia University (Ph.D.), former rector of Kabul University (1954-60), and Minister of Justice (1967-69).

This organization is not a government front organization, and its formation and continued activity have caused much hopeful discussion among Afghan exiles. It originated when several of its distinguished members were nominated by the government to join an official "Peace Jirga," charged with mediating between the government and the resistance. Those nominated went in a body to inform the National Front, the parent body of the Peace Jirga, that they would not participate in any body organized by the government. In discussions among themselves afterwards, however, they concluded that such a body would be indispensable if it were truly independent rather than government-sponsored. I include their declaration of intent as an appendix to this testimony.

The government has thus far tolerated the NSS's activity and allowed it to rent offices with money raised from donations by Afghan businessmen. It still restricts the NSS's activity by, for

instance, refusing permission for some of the Society's members to accept invitations to travel to conferences abroad. The U.S. should make full freedom for the NSS a key test of the possibility of holding genuine elections in Afghanistan.

The Kabul regime and the Soviets, however, are not the only parties guilty of human rights violations in Afghanistan. Members of resistance organizations supported by the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are also culpable. For instance, in many of the areas overrun by the mujahedin after the first phase of Soviet withdrawal, the fighters ran into the cities with no plan and engaged in arbitrary killings, rapes, and looting. All my information on this comes from resistance and pro-resistance sources. An Afghan resident in the U.S. who was Governor of Kabul under the royal regime and a delegate to the resistance's *shura* last February wrote that when resistance forces overran Kunduz in Northern Afghanistan in August 1988, one commander ordered the summary execution of 650 government officials as "Communists."¹² Other sources give higher numbers for civilians killed there. According to European relief organizations aiding mujahedin commanders in the area, there were also many rapes in Kunduz, for which the fighters were merely "reprimanded." (The usual punishment for rape in Afghanistan, or even for some kinds of voluntary sexual relations, is instant death.) Similar events occurred in Kunar, Eastern Afghanistan, where not only Afghans but Arab volunteers were involved in the killings.

Another case, which had a direct impact on the battle for Jalalabad, was the killing and mutilation of the garrison at Torkham. In early November 1988, the government garrison at this key border post (where the Peshawar-Jalalabad-Kabul highway crosses into Afghanistan) defected. The Pakistani army remanded the prisoners into the custody of the Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khales. Seventy four of them were killed and their bodies dumped in tea crates inside Afghanistan.¹³ The continued shelling of cities, especially Kabul, as well as the explosion of car bombs, has also reinforced fear of the resistance.

¹²Ghulam A's Ayeen, "Shura-ye Mushawwarati wa-Ayendeh-ye Afghanistan" (The Consultative Council and the Future of Afghanistan), *Qalam dar Khidmat-e-Jihad*, n.d.

¹³A meticulous Afghan scholar who had been imprisoned for years by the Kabul regime and was then living in Peshawar counted the bodies.

It would be wrong to use these events to justify prejudices that Afghan mujahedin are bloodthirsty or fanatical. Many mujahedin were outraged by these events. Talk about "the two sides" is always misleading in Afghanistan, and particularly so on the subject of human rights. Respect for human rights by mujahedin groups varies along a very wide spectrum. For instance, after the Torkham garrison was retaken by the government and then defected again, in late November 1988, the soldiers insisted on defecting to the party of Mojaddedi, who protected them and allowed the ICRC to interview them. Furthermore, while the extremist ideologies of some leaders, such as Khales or the Wahhabis in Kunar, played some role, those who committed most of these atrocities were simply young men whose entire youth has been consumed by this brutal, imposed war. I have in my possession lists provided by the Jamiat-e Islami of Kunduz Province of 629 villagers massacred by Soviet soldiers in one operation in the area in December 1984, and I have interviewed some of the survivors.¹⁴ A thirteen-year-old boy who had seen his mother bayoneted and shot in 1984 might have been a seventeen-year-old mujahed rushing into Kunduz in July 1988, after spending the interval in conditions of unbelievable deprivation and risk. Such feelings are liable to build-up in all wars; discipline may avert their consequences, but such discipline does not exist among most of the mujahedin.

In addition, there has been a reign of terror against "insufficiently Islamic" intellectuals in Peshawar. The main leaders responsible are Hekmatyar and Khales, who have been responsible for hundreds of killings, if not more. Eng. Ahmad Shah, a member of Sayyaf's party, Prime Minister of the interim government of June 1987, and minister of health in the current AIG, appeared to justify the murder of Prof. Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh, publisher of the Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, a noted poet and philosopher, and former dean of Kabul University, when he told me last January that, after all, Majrooh was "not a Muslim." (There is considerable evidence that Majrooh was killed at the order of Hekmatyar, because he had published a survey showing that 72 percent of Afghan refugees preferred the exiled former king, Zahir Shah, to any of the Peshawar leaders as a future leader of their

¹⁴See Barnett R. Rubin, To Die in Afghanistan (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1985), pp. 18-23; Jeri Laber and Barnett R. Rubin, "A Nation is Dying": Afghanistan under the Soviets 1979-1987 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 25-23.

country.) Asia Watch has published several editions of *News from Asia Watch* on this subject, which I helped to research, but here I will just quote from an interview with President Mojaddedi by Richard Mackenzie of *Insight*:

Mojaddedi, showing considerably more emotion than usual, says Hekmatyar has tried to assassinate him on several occasions and is responsible for the murder of "hundreds of innocent" people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"A hundred times he has done it and more than that. And then he denies it and he tells lies about it and he is not ashamed to tell lies. There are hundreds of cases of his assassinating innocent people here in Peshawar with the knowledge of the police and military people here. But because of the protection of the government from the time of Zia-ul-Haq, he has been protected 100 percent. No one has even questioned him."

In the strongest language ever used publicly by an Afghan about Hekmatyar, the president says, "His behavior is harmful to the *mujahideen*, harmful to our cause and harmful to the people of Afghanistan."¹⁵

It is worth underlining Mojaddedi's point that Hekmatyar has committed these crimes on the territory of Pakistan with complete impunity. He also did so for ten years while continuing to receive American aid. Within the last few weeks another Afghan refugee intellectual, Dr. Sadat Shegawal, who ran a clinic for Afghan refugees, was gunned down in the Shaheen Town section of Peshawar, presumably by fundamentalist death squads. As in other such cases, there have been no arrests.

Some mujahedin have also fired rockets into populated areas, especially Kabul city, and set off car bombs there. Such actions are exactly the same as the Soviet policy of bombing villages controlled by the resistance or the Kabul regime's policy of firing SCUD missiles blindly toward resistance-held areas.

According to information I have received from a variety of sources over the past year or so, most of the random shelling of Kabul city is done by small commanders who are not strongly affiliated to any party, but who work directly with the Pakistani ISI. In some cases they are former sub-commanders of larger commanders like Abdul Haq, who have been broken off from the

¹⁵"When Policy Tolls in Fool's Paradise," *Insight* (September 11, 1989), p. 10.

main organization by "subcontracting." I cannot verify this, and it may be a case of Afghans trying to blame foreigners for some of their countrymen's misdeeds. Some of my sources, however, are Western diplomats, not Afghans. Furthermore, no one suggests, even if the shelling takes place at the behest of ISI officers, that it reflects the official policy of the government of Pakistan.

Heroin Trade

The expansion of the heroin trade does involve some violations of human rights. I include a discussion of it here mainly because it is another issue related to the war with important humanitarian consequences. The administration also claims that eradicating drug trafficking is a major policy goal.

Both some resistance commanders and some of the Peshawar leaders are extensively involved in the heroin trade which has made the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area into the second largest source of opium in the world. The evidence is much clearer for the commanders, as one can see the poppies growing in the areas under their control. Mullah Nasim Akhundzada of Harakat-e Inqilab, who won last summer's opium war in the Helmand Valley, and who until his recent assassination, possibly by rival drug traffickers, presided over a large, fertile area where poppies are grown on land irrigated by the U.S.-built Helmand Valley Dam Project, was only the best known. (In a May 22 speech, Najibullah included him on a list of fifteen commanders invited to participate in the government and receive full autonomy in their areas.)¹⁶

Opium has traditionally been grown in the mountainous land of North Helmand, which has very good climate for it. The war and pressure from some resistance commanders has led to the expansion of the crop throughout the Helmand Valley, and also, of course, ¹⁶the highlands of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.¹⁷ Before the war, the landowners of South Helmand grew cotton, oilseeds, and melons, which they sold for either industrial processing or export.

¹⁶Kabul Times, May 23, 1989.

¹⁷The director of an American relief organization operating in a border province of Eastern Afghanistan reported that the landowners were trying to expel the American organization, because they feared pressure against the growing of opium poppies, which offered greater opportunities for profit than foreign assistance.

Now, however, they have neither the transport nor markets. Furthermore, as a result of years of Soviet and Afghan government bombing of the irrigated lands of South Helmand, the landowners can cultivate only 10-20 percent of their lands. Hence they grow opium, although the yields are not so high there as in the North. First of all, they need not concern themselves with marketing -- the buyer comes to them -- and, second, they were compelled to do so by Commander Mullah Nasim Akhundzada.

Mullah Nasim decreed that 50 percent of the land had to be in opium cultivation. He gave delivery quotas to the landowners. If they failed to produce enough to meet their delivery quotas, they had to purchase the difference. Mullah Nasim maintained this degree of control through ruthless methods. According to resistance sources, he has killed many people, and even castrated them.

Mullah Nasim was involved in negotiations with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. He met directly with Ambassador Oakley, who offered him \$2 million in USAID programs if he would cease production of opium. This is a sharp contrast to our government's opposition to negotiations with drug traffickers in Colombia. After his recent assassination, Mullah Nasim also reportedly received a warm eulogy as a good commander in a cable from the U.S. diplomatic mission in Pakistan. Although in conformity with our policy of not aiding known drug dealers, the U.S. stopped direct supply of Mullah Nasim, he was still in good standing with his party, which the U.S. does assist. In fact, Mullah Nasim was killed while leaving a meeting with Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader of Harakat-e Inqilab. Furthermore, he was the Deputy Defense Minister of the AIG, which the U.S. government has purported to see as the most legitimate political leadership in Afghanistan and the most desirable channel for transferring arms to the resistance inside Afghanistan.

The main transit point for drugs in southwest Afghanistan is Robat, a traditional Baluch smuggling center, where Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran meet. The refineries are in Koh-e Sultan, about a half hour to an hour's drive north of the town of Gird-e Jangal, the financial center for the trade. In Gird-e Jangal there is reported to be so much currency of all denominations that the dealers do not count it but weigh it.

In Koh-e Sultan, usually reliable sources report that there are over 6 opium refineries making heroin. Most of them belong to

Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar). There are many groups of "mujahedin" there to protect the factories. The raw materials come from Helmand, Mullah Nasim's area, and from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area in the east.

For each pickup there are about 10-15 men who get about 50 kg of heroin. Then it is trucked to Taftan (Pakistan), to Bazargan (Iran), and from there into Turkey. Each of the drivers is paid Rs. 10,000 for each such trip. The Iranians permit the transit of heroin through their territory as long as it goes to the West.

Mujahedin, of course, are not the only people involved in the heroin trade in the area. It is a big business. One must observe that Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for its outlet to the rest of the world, and the heroin trade is no exception. In fact, the largest U.S. backed group many of whose members are involved in the heroin trade is probably the Pakistan military. The government of Benazir Bhutto has been committed to eradicating this trade, and it has made some courageous efforts. Let me quote from a much longer article that shows how difficult it will be to succeed, especially as long as the "covert" supply of arms to the resistance continues:¹⁸

Over the past decade allegations [of drug trafficking] involving the Pakistan army have come closer and closer to that select cadre which have been most intimately involved in the "covert effort" in support of the Afghan war and the arms pipeline which has supplied that resistance in its brave fight against the Soviets. But around the war has grown up an enormous illicit trade in arms and narcotics. The Pakistani press has repeatedly noted the widely held belief that the principal conduit by which weapons reach the Afghan resistance in the north is in fact one of the main organized routes by which heroin reaches Karachi for trans-shipment to Europe and the United States. "It is really very simple," wrote *The Herald* (January 1987). "If you control the poppy fields, Karachi, and the road which links the two, you will be so rich that you will control Pakistan."

The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pipeline for weapons to the Afghan mujahideen is organized and coordinated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It is under the ISI's direction that weapons and supplies move north by two principal means. One route utilizes Pakistan Air Force transport. But the main carrier of supplies is an organization called the National Logistics Cell (NLC). It is the largest transport organization in the country and is wholly owned by the Pakistan army. All drivers and leaders are Pakistan army personnel and security is tight at its main installations.

¹⁸Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Heroin Empire," *Newsline* (July 1989), pp. 66-74b.

According to reports that have appeared in a section of the press, NLC trucks have been used repeatedly in the shipment of heroin from the Frontier to Karachi port. In its September 1985 issue *The Herald* gave the following eyewitness report: "The drug is carried in NLC trucks, which come sealed from the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] and are never checked by police. They come down from Peshawar where they deliver their cargo, sacks of grain, to government godowns [warehouses]. Some of these sacks contain packets of heroin. . . This has been going on for about three and a half years."

The report went on to describe an incident, again quoting an eyewitness, in support of the allegations against the NLC. According to this report, "A few months ago, an NLC truck was involved in an accident near Thana Bala Khaz. The driver was thrown out of the cab and lost consciousness. When he came to and found a number of people gathered around him he became anxious. Not surprisingly -- because when the trailer had overturned, a white powder spilled out all over the road."

Similar accusations against the NLC were made in January 1988 by the former Sindh Provincial Minister for Excise, Murad Ali Shah. The minister demanded that the police be given the authority to search vehicles for narcotics, specifically those operating under the authority of the NLC. According to police sources, the NLC has remained strictly out of bounds. "If we want to investigate the NLC or military personnel who we believe may be involved in the narcotics trade we are told to 'keep out' by the army," says a senior police official referring to his experience over the last half decade. "If you pushed too hard, you ended up transferred. It's that simple." . . .

The role of the NLC in the heroin trade was confirmed to me by a logistics specialist of the mujahedin. As we were riding through Khyber Agency on the way back from Afghanistan, he pointed out to me the palace of one Ayub Kukikhel, a major heroin trader, right by the side of the road. After recounting some anecdotes about this colorful figure (since arrested by the Bhutto government, although he had enjoyed the protection of Gen. Fazle Haq, Zia's governor of NWFP), he confirmed to me that Kukikhel transported his heroin to Karachi in NLC trucks. My source is a highly educated man who has worked closely with the NLC for years, supplying resistance fronts inside Afghanistan.

As for the mujahedin, refugees, and ordinary Afghans, all of them are in desperate need of resources. If there will be war, they need guns and ammunition to fight, and if there will be peace, they need money to rebuild. In neither case do they feel confident that they can rely on us for what they feel they need, and, in any case, relying on us, even if we come through, involves costs -- loss of

independence, loss of pride. An easy-to-raise, immensely profitable cash crop is the obvious answer.

Furthermore, in the Pakistani tribal territories and the vast expanses of Afghanistan ruled by local forces lies probably the largest expanse of territory in the world without any government presence. It is also an area where what we call smuggling (and what the Afghans call trading) has always been a major activity. In fact, as one mujahed once explained to me, the small trucks that transport mujahedin and supplies back and forth across the border are the same trucks that were -- and are -- used by smugglers. The infrastructure already existed in part when the war started, and now it has been expanded.¹⁹ Add to this that this area is also one of the most devastated and poverty-stricken places in the world, and one can only conclude that it would be amazing if these resourceful people did not respond to the demand generated, let us remember, mainly by *our own immensely wealthy society*.

Background

From 1980 to 1988, American policy was to increase the military, political, and economic costs to the Soviet Union of its invasion of Afghanistan. Some analysts believed that the Soviets would never leave, but that it was important that they learn that such ventures are costly. Others felt that sufficient military pressure could drive them out. In 1985 and 1986 the latter group won out, and our supplies to the mujahedin increased in both quantity and quality.

Through all this time we gave little thought to the politics of the groups we were supporting. Certain groups had established themselves on Pakistani soil, and the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the regime of Gen. Zia took care of getting the weapons to them. The role of these Afghan exile groups was to get the arms into Afghanistan in order to inflict costs on the USSR. The relevant question was, in the words of Pakistani

¹⁹Another incident -- I was once walking through a part of the Nasirbagh refugee camp in Peshawar which is inhabited by Mohmand tribesmen from the border area. My escort, himself a Mohmand with an advanced degree in statistics, pointed out a garishly painted truck parked in a refugee compound belonging to an acquaintance and remarked, "Here is one of the trucks with which they bring the heroin for your country." This illustrates that the drug trade provides refugee relief as well as reconstruction funds.

Ambassador Jamsheed Marker, who was "good at killing Russians?" Policy makers paid little attention to the history of the leaders recognized by Pakistan or their relation to the fighters inside the country.

Our policy makers stoutly rejected the evidence that Gorbachev intended to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, despite clear indications to that effect by early 1986. Hence we did not reconsider our approach to the Afghan resistance.

By the time the Soviets withdrew, our policy-makers had spent years trying to build up the exiled leaders in Pakistan through whom we had been shipping arms and were committed to the proposition that these men were the legitimate leaders of the Afghan people. Hence we prepared for them to take over after the Soviet withdrawal in the wake of a general uprising which would not even require major new weapons supplies. This did not happen. Nonetheless until very recently we have been wed to the idea that this exiled leadership should act as the core of a transition to a new government.

The resistance movement inside Afghanistan is indeed a broadly supported indigenous movement against foreign troops and an invasive, illegitimate central state. The organizational forms of the exiled leadership of that movement, however, depend on those who provide a territorial base, money, and weapons. The ultimate base of local organization in Afghanistan -- where the real power lies -- is not in the parties but in the traditional tribal and religious networks, and in some cases in new organizations led by commanders, through which the parties function. These networks, some of which also operate in the PDPA, frustrated Soviet attempts to build a viable puppet party in Kabul. They are now frustrating attempts by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps the U.S. to impose their own goals on the people of Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been supporting three of the seven leaders of Peshawar (Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and Khaled) since 1974, before the Communist coup and the Soviet invasion. These leaders began their struggle against the governments of Zaher Shah and President Daoud, which the U.S. supported. These Islamic revolutionaries, along with Sayyaf, who joined them later (see below) were -- and are -- fighting not for the self-determination of Afghanistan but for their own version of an Islamic state. Considerable evidence indicates that

most of the people of Afghanistan, although they want a loose form of Islamic government, are opposed to the Islamic revolutionaries' concept of a centralized Islamic state. The Islamic revolutionaries thus oppose not only the Soviets and the Kabul regime but also other Afghans -- including others in the resistance and Zahir Shah -- who oppose their ideology. I do not subscribe to the view that the U.S. should necessarily fear or oppose Islamic political movements in Afghanistan or elsewhere; but it is not our business to support them in pursuing goals that contradict our interests and values. It is up to the Afghans whether they want one or another type of Islamic state; our interest is solely in letting them decide for themselves.

The Pakistani military initially established close relations with these leaders, especially Hekmatyar, in order to pursue the Pakistani goal, inherited from the British Raj, of securing the northwest frontier against Afghan nationalism. After the Soviet invasion, it was the Pakistani military regime, not any representative body of Afghans, who decided that six particular leaders would be recognized, and that all of those recognized would be religious rather than nationalist or tribal leaders. Subsequently, the large financial involvement of Saudi Arabia led to the formation of a seventh party based entirely on Saudi money (Sayyaf).

U.S. government documents show that since 1978 representatives of the exiled former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, tried to reach the Afghan refugees and mujahedin but were denied access by Pakistan.²⁰ When the U.S. government expressed an interest in supporting the Afghan mujahedin, Pakistan chose which leaders would meet with the American representatives. The first meeting between a special envoy of the CIA and Afghan resistance leaders selected by Pakistan reportedly took place in Peshawar in May 1979.

The U.S. agreed to a division of labor with Pakistan, based on our differing interests and capacities. Of course, Gen. Zia was a very respected figure among senior policy makers in the Reagan administration, and his views were always weighed very carefully. Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to say that we passively let him set the agenda. The U.S. goal was to increase the cost to the USSR. Pakistan, we estimated, not unreasonably, had the contacts and

²⁰CIA cable 20781, Los Angeles, August 31, 1979; DOS cable 3531, Islamabad, June 14, 1979.

knowledge to manage the details of how this was to be done. Therefore we subcontracted the choice of which Afghans to support to Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia was also involved in this sub-contracting. The Saudis provided much of the funding for both the political offices of the resistance parties and the transportation of weapons and supplies inside Afghanistan. Since the Saudis funded many of the offices, they have had a disproportionate influence over the various unions of mujahed groups. For instance, the "Islamic Unity for the Liberation of Afghanistan," originally a coalition of several parties, chose Sayyaf as its leader because of his ability to get Saudi funds. He later made this "Unity" into a separate party with himself as leader. Saudi money is also a principal reason why Eng. Ahmad Shah (not Ahmad Shah Maseoud), a member of Sayyaf's party, was named Prime Minister of the interim government chosen in June 1987, and why Sayyaf himself became the spokesman for the February 1989 *shura* and later was chosen as Prime Minister of the AIG.

As for transport, it is vital to recall that the resistance has no centralized logistics, as it has no general staff or command and control. Commanders take possession of weapons from ISI or party "godowns" (warehouses) in the tribal territories and then must hire pack animals or trucks to take the supplies in. The Saudi Red Crescent office in Parachinar was the major funder for logistics. According to a moderate party logistics specialist whom I know well, the Saudis paid 100 percent of expenses, plus a 5 percent contingency fund, for the fundamentalist parties, but only 15 percent for the moderate-traditionalist parties, whom they judged to be too *watani*, or nationalist. This may explain in part why the moderate parties have such a small presence north of the Hindu Kush mountain range.

These arrangements appeared to work for many years, but they left us peculiarly ill-equipped to affect the outcome of a political settlement in a way consistent with our interests and values. The most powerful groups we have strengthened have goals that go far beyond what we intended to support. Since the ideological goals of some of these groups require these leaders to oppose not merely Communists but all Afghans they consider to be Westernized or un-Islamic, they are in principle opposed to broadening their political base to include the masses of relatively non-ideological nationalist, Muslim Afghans. This ideology also provides a rationale for

maintaining the narrow ethnic base (Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtuns) of most of the exiled leadership. As far as I can determine, the U.S. has done nothing to strengthen the hand of those Afghans who incline toward a more liberal interpretation of Islam that would, to the extent possible in trying circumstances, respect human rights and democracy. Contrary to stereotypes, such political forces still exist, despite their repression in both Kabul and Peshawar.

If recent reports are to be believed, our influence is likely to be diminishing. A report by Robin Wright in the November 19, 1989, Los Angeles Times claimed that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were mounting a three-month effort to re-supply the mujahedin. The total cost of the effort was to be \$715 million, of which the U.S. was to supply \$280 million, or 39 percent.²¹ On the same day, the New York Times reported that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most radical of the resistance leaders, most of whose efforts are dedicated to fighting other elements of the resistance, notably commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, and who has a human rights record as bad as anyone in Afghanistan, would no longer receive "any direct supplies of munitions purchased with American money." The arrangement with Saudi Arabia, whose funds (61 percent of the total) are not subject to any such restriction, makes a mockery of this decision in a way reminiscent of the Iran-Contra scandal. In reaction to increased activity by Shi'a Iran, its main rival in the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia is reported to have increased its support to Hekmatyar, the most militant Sunni Islamic revolutionary among the Afghans, while also continuing to support Sayyaf.

The main shortcomings of the leadership of the AIG are that:

- 1.) It has a narrow social and ethnic base, mainly coming from disfavored sectors and religious leadership of the Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtun tribes of Eastern Afghanistan, and largely excluding traditional tribal leaders (including those of the Ghilzai and Eastern Pashtuns), Western-educated professionals of the old regime whose skills would be vital for reconstruction, Shi'a Muslims, Persian and Turkic-speaking ethnic minorities, and Durrani Pashtuns from Southern and Western Afghanistan;
- 2.) Its leaders are not accountable in any way to the refugees or the mujahedin inside Afghanistan. The latter is not solely a result of the personality of the

²¹The same article reported, "A recent CIA assessment predicts that a new [mujahedin] offensive could topple the regime by the end of February." See above.

leaders but of the mechanism through which they have gained and kept their position, namely by acting as representatives authorized by foreign supporters of the mujahedin.

Furthermore, the AIG has made it clear through its decisions that it wishes to dominate rather than consult with the commanders inside Afghanistan. I believe that Tip O'Neill was thinking of Boston when he said, "All politics is local," but this is even more true of Afghanistan. Under the old regime and the Communists, the local administrators (provincial governors) were appointed by the center and were meant to control not represent the local people. In order to assure that they would represent the center, they were generally drawn from a tribe or ethnic group other than the predominant one in the area.

In the course of the resistance, commanders have built up local organizations, many of which are beginning to develop representative institutions, although not Western-style democracy. These local *shuras* have appointed their own governors in some cases. Such arrangements could go a long way toward alleviating ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, as the different groups would have local self-government without having to negotiate formal quotas for representation of the type that have torn apart Lebanon. The AIG, however, has passed a "law" stating that its Interior Ministry will appoint the governors. When it tried to do so a few months ago in Kunar province, directly on the Pakistan border and easily accessible to Peshawar by paved road, the AIG nominee was expelled by the local *shura* of mujahedin. The AIG was powerless to do anything, as it commands no forces. A minister of the AIG to whom I spoke in January did not even know that a *shura* in Taleqan had approved a Governor of Takhar nominated by Massoud, although I had read about this in a newsletter published by Jamiat-e Islami.

Finally, while the mujahedin inside Afghanistan have often had to withstand extremes of privation and danger, the exiled leaders have lived in comfort and have taken advantage of the opportunities afforded by their position to accumulate personal wealth. Yunus Khales, for instance, who before the war was a partner with his brother in a bicycle repair shop, now owns a fleet of 50 buses operating between Mardan and Swat. More sophisticated leaders are reported to have substantial foreign investments. Some are reported to be involved in the heroin trade (see above). Confidential records of relief organizations that I have seen in Peshawar are filled with

detailed reports of officials of the resistance parties profiteering by selling weapons, vehicles, and other supplies meant for use in the war. According to Christina Lamb of the Financial Times (February 15, 1990), "Much of the \$700m arms recently sanctioned [see above] are being sold in Sind." (Sind province of Pakistan is the scene of bloody battles among several ethnic groups.) The refugees and the mujahedin are fully aware of this corruption and often see the party leaders, or at least some of them, as people profiting from their misery.

The Political-Military Stalemate

There are no prospects whatever for a complete military victory by the mujahedeen in the next year. Such a victory would require organizational work that resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, for instance, estimates would require 3 to 5 years. Even within such a time frame, there would be no guarantee of success. Under certain circumstances some of the mujahedeen, in particular Massoud, would be capable of inflicting immediate, politically significant military costs on the Kabul regime. At present these circumstances do not exist, and, as I mentioned above, I am increasingly skeptical that they will exist.

The origins of the current stalemate go back to the way the resistance movement was organized, as described above, but its immediate antecedents are to be found in the effects of the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet withdrawal took place in two stages. During the first three months, half of the Soviet troops left Afghanistan, and the remainder were deployed in defensive positions around major cities and communications arteries, especially those vital to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the supply of the Kabul regime. As a result of the first stage of withdrawal, the Afghan government had to concentrate its troops in defensive positions. It could no longer maintain such a far-flung presence and was unable to use troops in any offensive operations against rural areas. The government lost control of all posts along the border with Pakistan, including two provincial centers, which greatly eased the logistical situation of the mujahedin. It also lost control of several areas in more isolated portions of the center of the country, including at least two provincial capitals.²²

²²In the south the government lost all presence from the border post of Spin Baldak nearly to Qandahar. The regime lost the provincial center of Paktika.

Since November 1988, the territorial situation has not changed much. It is important to emphasize that notions of "control" derived from images of a static war or images of two antagonists confronting each other at every point of contact give a false impression of much of Afghanistan. There are many areas where there is no fighting and which both sides could claim to "control." Let me illustrate this with some quotations from an article published in AFGHANews, the biweekly English-language newsletter of Jamiat-e Islami, the largest group in the resistance, a moderately radical Islamic party mainly supported by Tajiks from northern Afghanistan:

In Totom Dara, despite being close to the enemy base and the Salang highway, Mujahideen have opened schools for the children. The voice of children singing [Islamic] revolutionary songs can be overheard by the enemy posts along the road side. . . .

We crossed the road to enter Qarabagh. We passed close to the regime posts and they did not disturb us. It seemed that if the Mujahideen did not attack the regime troops they would not bother the Mujahideen. . . . The regime controls the district headquarters of Qarabagh. We passed close to the regime positions on our way to Ishtif sub-district. . . . Jamiat is in control of Ishtif and the people there live in peace. . . . The government has a symbolic presence in Ishtif but it does not have anything to do with the people. The Mujahideen have tolerated the presence of an enemy outpost in return for free passage of food and other essential goods from the regime controlled areas. . . .

Urgun. In Paktia the garrison of Khost became the regime's most forward position with the fall of Jaji. In Ningrahar, after the fall of the Torkham border post, mujahedin advanced down the road toward Jalalabad and overran the important garrison of Shinwari district. The regime fell back to the post of Samarkhel, just outside of Jalalabad and then abandoned it after the first offensive there last March. In Kunar, the border post of Barikot was evacuated, Asmar fell, and the mujahedin advanced up the river valley and overran the provincial capital of Chaghassarai (also known as Asadabad), where they have established a provincial government. In the center of the country, the resistance took over Waran, the capital of Bamiyan. In the north, near the Soviet border, the demoralized regime garrison in Kunduz disintegrated, and the mujahedin rushed into this major economic center, although the government managed to drive them out with fresh troops and perhaps some bombing from across the Soviet border. In the same region, the well-organized mujahedin of Ahmad Shah Massoud's Supervisory Council of the North (SCN) took over several garrisons and managed to take and hold Taloqan, the provincial center of Takhar, about 50 km from the Soviet border, where they have established a local administration. Undisciplined resistance fighters killed many civilians and prisoners, raped women, and destroyed property during many of these advances, as described below. For more details and a chronology, see Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan: 'Back to Feudalism,'" Current History (December 1989), pp. 421 ff.

The Chack power plant (in a resistance-controlled area) is presently idle. Its workers are being paid by the Kabul regime based on a tacit agreement between the Mujahideen and the Kabul regime.²³

There are numerous factors contributing to this result, and there is no objective method of weighing them all. Those who favor a continued military effort emphasize the Soviet Union's supplies to the Kabul regime. Others emphasize political factors. I would like to draw the committee's attention to the conclusions of two outstanding experts in the field, Napoléon Bonaparte and Carl von Clausewitz. Napoléon said, "In war moral factors [e.g. morale, organization, discipline, unity] are three fourths, and the balance of material forces is only one fourth." Clausewitz wrote, "The means and forms that a strategist employs are so very simple . . . that it seems ridiculous in the light of common sense when critics dismiss them, as they do so often, with ponderous solemnity. . . . It is even more ridiculous when we consider that these very critics usually exclude all moral qualities from strategic theory, and only examine material factors."²⁴

The sources of political weakness and material strength of the Kabul regime and the sources of political strength and relative material weakness of the resistance are relatively well known. The Kabul regime is so lacking in legitimacy because of its Communist background and Soviet imposition that it has been unable to field an army even half the size of the pre-1978 Afghan army, and the loyalty of its troops has been questionable. The PDPA and the government administration have virtually no organizational presence in the country outside of a few major population centers. They have been wracked by conflict between the two major PDPA factions, Khalq and Parcham, as well as among sub-factions of each. They do, however, have a unified command, a well-trained officer corps, a large, well-trained, ruthless intelligence organization, assured supplies, motorized and air transport, electronic communications, and

²³Abdul Hafiz, "A short walk around Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal," AFGHANews 6 (February 1, 1990), pp. 6-7. Other parts of the article describe fighting between the resistance and the government as well as between Hezb-e Islami and other parties. While Abdul Hafiz walked unmolested by several regime posts, he and his companions had to detour to avoid posts set up by Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar).

²⁴Napoléon, from his correspondence, commenting on the war in Spain. Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 178. Similar lessons are to be found in Sun Tzu, The Art of War.

relatively secure supply depots located at the center of their transportation network. The resistance enjoyed immense prestige and support as a movement against foreign invaders and an anti-Islamic government. While supplies improved after 1985, it always suffered from lack of transport and communications and from the only relatively secure depots being in Pakistan, at the edge rather than the center of its supply network. The first stage of the Soviet withdrawal and the resulting retreat of the government, however, improved its communication and supply lines significantly.

Of course the Soviet Union has supplied the government with an unprecedented amount of weapons, including new sophisticated weapons, while for some time after the Soviet withdrawal there appeared to be a halt or delay in the supply of weapons to the mujahedin. Since the military task of the mujahedin had shifted from guerrilla raids and defense to conventional attacks on compact, well-defended targets, this imbalance counted for even more than it would have in the previous period of the war. Weapons, however, are effective only in the hands of an army ready to fight. The military imbalance between the Communist-controlled militaries and the opposition was of course even greater in the countries of Eastern Europe, yet it had virtually no effect on the political outcomes.

The early optimistic assessments, which predicted a collapse of the Kabul regime from within, were correct in concentrating on the political-moral factors; where they erred was in estimating what those factors were. The major error was in the evaluation of the resistance, although Najibullah has also shown himself to be remarkably skilled at profiting from the faults of his opponents.

The central problem is that the resistance has failed to organize itself as a credible political alternative to the regime in Kabul. This is the key not only to the surprising morale and determination of Kabul's forces, but also to the lack of progress toward conventional military organization within the resistance. Conventional attacks require command and control, which enable a force to coordinate in space (concentrating against a target) and in time (hitting several targets simultaneously). Command and control under a unified, politically legitimate, skilled leadership is also essential for what Clausewitz and all other students of war see as the most essential task: subordinating military decisions to a political strategy with clearly defined goals. The mujahedin do not have this capacity at the national level. They are unlikely to attain it, especially as long as

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the U.S., and Iran are pushing and pulling them in different directions.

The lack of discipline manifested itself in the treatment of civilians, prisoners and defectors as described above. The result has been what Solidarity leader Adam Michnik calls "the Kabul syndrome." Arguing that the Polish opposition must discipline itself to relieve the fear of the Communists, Michnik observed, "In Kabul, the people in the government know that only the guillotine awaits them if they cede any power."²⁵ They feel they are fighting for their lives and honor, regardless of their political views. Many resistance leaders have made statements condemning the mistreatment of defectors, and some have made concrete efforts to protect them. It may be too late, however.

The opposition between a foreign-installed PDPA government supported by Soviet troops and a patriotic, Islamic resistance has also become less definitive for many Afghans.²⁶ The Soviet troops have gone, and Najibullah is still fighting, even after analysts around the world predicted his defeat. On the other side, the failed attempts by the resistance to mount major offensives and to constitute themselves as an alternative government have revealed both selfish squabbling among the leaders and, most important, their dependence on foreign patrons. Afghan nationalism now works increasingly against the exiled leadership of the resistance (as well as those few commanders with strong foreign ties).

The *shura* in Pakistan in February 1989 became a focus of such resentment. Afghans believe, with some reason, that the Peshawar leaders allowed themselves to be manipulated by Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia. A close Afghan friend of mine, a mujahed for ten years and an official of the seven-party alliance, summarized this

²⁵Quoted in Jim Hoagland, "The World Turned Upside Down," Washington Post, February 8, 1990.

²⁶Olivier Roy comments, "As long as the *Mujahedin* were fighting Soviet troops, the Afghan war was considered a *jihād*, a holy war against invaders and infidels. An East-West dimension was added when the Reagan administration decided to apply the 'roll-back' policy to Afghanistan, even if the *Mujahedin* did not wait for US support to start their struggle against the communists and the USSR. Now that the Soviet troops have withdrawn, the domestic and regional factors are slowly prevailing upon the East-West ideological dimension." ("Afghanistan: back to tribalism or on to Lebanon?" Third World Quarterly 10 (October 1989) 4: 70.)

view when he said that the purpose of the *shura* was "to choose a Pakistani government for Afghanistan." The increasingly visible role of Arab volunteers, distributing what to Afghans are huge sums of money, propagating the alien Wahhabi sect of Islam, has also increased resentment. One commander near Jalalabad told me how he had rejected Arab offers of money in return for following their ways and commented, "I spit on their shoes. They think *jihad* is a business, where we sell ourselves for the highest price."

The same commander at that time (February 4, 1989) expressed his resentment at attempts by the ISI (supported, as we now know, by the CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad) to force him into an attack on Jalalabad to install the government to be chosen at the *shura*. He and a number of other commanders in the area described to me their own strategy of forming a local council of commanders which could enter into negotiations for the peaceful surrender of the Jalalabad garrison. The pressure from foreign sponsors eventually pushed them into the offensive, with disastrous results. The Afghan government has played up -- and exaggerated -- foreign involvement with the mujahedin. Najibullah now claims that the only foreigners fighting in Afghanistan are Pakistani officers and Arab Wahhabi volunteers with the resistance. These charges have had some effect.

Of course, this was nothing new, although it had taken on new dimensions. From the very beginning the ISI has tried to micro-manage the war effort by distributing weapons in return for undertaking specific operations. As noted above, the resistance has no general staff or command and control. Most strategic military planning, at least for Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border, has been done by the ISI.

The methods used are the traditional ones of tribal policy. Since the ISI does not have a direct chain of command over the resistance groups (just as the Pakistani administration has no power to enforce decisions in tribal territory), it uses offers of money and guns in conjunction with the rivalry between different commanders to pressure mujahedin into undertaking the operations they want. This is known as "subcontracting." This is how the mujahedin were pressured into attacking Jalalabad. The commanders were told that if they agreed to make the attack, they would receive money and weapons. If they refused, it was up to them, but they would not receive anything, and their rivals in other parties would.

In Qandahar the ISI tried the same thing. Here I would like to quote from a memorandum of conversation I had with an Afghan who has worked with the Qandahar resistance for over ten years:

When the attack on Jalalabad was launched, no one told the Qandahar shura [of mujahedin] or consulted with them. When they heard it was being planned, they sent a delegation to Peshawar to ask the ISI and AIG to postpone the attack so that they could prepare simultaneous attacks against targets in the Southwest, from Qandahar to Herat. No one listened to them.

Then in May [two months later], when the attack on Jalalabad had failed, the ISI came to the Qandahar shura and asked them to attack Qandahar city. They offered money and guns.²⁷ They had several plans of action. One was to blow up the Dahla Dam, about 40-50 kms upriver from Qandahar on the Arghandab, in Shah Wali Kot district.²⁸ Since then the Shura has moved Cmdr. Lalai to the area in order to guard the dam against the ISI and Gulbuddin. The shura refused all of this and said that we have offered before and you didn't listen to us. Now you are asking us to attack for no reason and kill a lot of innocent people in the city.

Then they sent Nabi and Khales there [two of the leaders, both Pashtun from Eastern Afghanistan] to try to persuade them. The mujahedin asked them what authority they had in Qandahar? At the shura that chose the AIG there were 18 people from all of Southwestern Afghanistan (6 provinces), but there were 47 people from Hissarak, Khales's home village.

After this the ISI and the AIG declared that the Qandahar shura was "illegal" and began to create a new "shura." (The court of the Qandahar shura under Mullah Parsanch of Moqor responded to this by handing down a fatwa or decree in August that Wahhabis were kafer and could be shot on sight.) The ISI paid some smaller commanders, from Khales's and Gulbuddin's parties to start a new shura. They got about a dozen of them, but they were very small commanders, with a total of only about 300 men among them. They shelled the airport, but nothing came of it.

Then they sent Gulbuddin to Qandahar in July. The shura of Qandahar warned him not to come. When he came in a convoy, Haji Abdul Latif [NIFA commander] shelled him, not to kill him but to frighten him away. He was forced to leave Qandahar that night. The next month Haji Abdul Latif was assassinated, poisoned. Everyone believes it was by

²⁷According to another Afghan source, "The ISI invited commanders to a meeting, pulled up about eight trucks filled with weapons, and 'covered a table with money.' They told the mujahedin that if they attacked Qandahar city, they would receive all the money and weapons."

²⁸According to a third source from the area, the purpose of this plan was to flood the city so the mujahedin could "shoot the Communists like birds."

Gulbuddin, but to preserve unity among the mujahedin, his son said it was by KHAD. They killed the two who confessed to it very quickly, even by mujahedin standards, instead of doing an investigation. This was to hush it up.

Then the ISI brought 2 commanders from Wardak (a Ghilzai Pashtun area in Eastern Afghanistan) who paid each of their mujahedin Rs. 500 per day, plus Rs 50,000 in case of death and Rs. 20,000 in case of injury. This created a terrible reaction. It was not jihad but a mercenary war. People began to ask themselves, is this still a jihad? This has become a very big debate. This is very important for the Afghans, because if you die in jihad you go to heaven, but if you die killing other Muslims in a struggle for power, you will go to hell. Now with the alliance of Gulbuddin and Tanai, people are saying that jihad is finished. It is just a power struggle. This will make a settlement easier. [My emphasis -- BRR]

Since none of this worked, by August, three months later, the ISI said there should be an economic siege of Qandahar. But by this time even the smaller shura was turning against the ISI. The ISI had named a Sayyaf commander the head of it and all of the supplies went through him. But only half of the supplies reached Qandahar. The rest were sold either in Sind or to the government. There is a lot of cash in Afghanistan now. They call Afghania "containers," because the banknotes are just brought in containers from the USSR, where they are printed.

As a result of the ISI-ordered blockade of Qandahar, bread in the city went from 20 Afs. a loaf to 60 Afs. But the governor, Ulumi, managed to supply bread to the people for 10 Afs. a loaf. All they had to do was sign a paper at the government office, so people who had had nothing to do with the government for 10 years signed it. What they said was that the ISI made Ulumi into "Ulumi Sahab."

This also failed. So they gave up on it by October-November. By this time there was open anti-ISI feeling among the mujahedin. It was growing at all levels. Cooperating with the ISI was being equated with cooperating with the KGB. The average Afghan was beginning to feel he would prefer to cooperate with Najib than with the ISI.

It was after this sorry sequence of events that a delegation of the mujahedin finally met with the governor, Gen. Ulumi, and were taken to Kabul one night to meet Najibullah.

It is partly in order to insulate the resistance from such pressure that Cmdr. Massoud has advocated the formation of councils of mujahedin similar to his SCN. Since the council makes collective decisions and prevents defections, the ISI has had a harder time making strategic and tactical decisions for the resistance in northeast Afghanistan. This presumably is why Massoud has been starved for weapons by the ISI.

Of course, the U.S. also occasionally participates in such decisions. It was reported in the New York Times, and never denied as far as I know, that the decision to launch the attack on Jalalabad last March was taken in a meeting in Islamabad attended by Pakistani officials, Ambassador Oakley, and not a single Afghan.

As far as political decisions are concerned, it was Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia who pressured the exiled parties into particular forms of "unity" and into forming a series of "interim governments." As noted above, the plan for a new *shura* this year was also primarily at the initiative of the supporters of the mujahedin.

Finally, in the one area where the mujahedin have a regional organization with command and control and a political strategy, rivalry among the organizations undermined them. Last July, Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the Supervisory Council of the North, was finalizing plans for an attack that used all the classic elements of strategy. He was going to concentrate his most disciplined forces against the city of Kunduz, while launching simultaneous diversionary attacks across northeast Afghanistan. When the key commanders of the operation were returning from a strategy meeting, they were ambushed by a commander of Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), Sayyad Jamal, and later executed, apparently with the approval of Hekmatyar's Peshawar headquarters.

Later, when Massoud tried to move against Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan Province, his forces were again attacked from the rear by Hezb forces in Ishkamish. Massoud claims that throughout the entire past year he has received no shipments of weapons. His representatives privately say that the reason is that he has refused tactical and strategic direction from the ISI, whose operational officers are allied with Hekmatyar against him. Pakistani officials always deny this. It is mainly Massoud and, secondarily, some other independent large commanders who could impose real military costs on Kabul. These commanders, however, are often undermined by foreign supporters intent on micromanaging the war at their expense.

I could recount other events from other regions: how Ismael Khan in Herat drove many of his supporters away by imprisoning landowners who sold grain to the government; how the resistance in Helmand was torn apart by battles over control of a bridge vital to the transportation of opium to processing facilities in and near

Pakistan; how the resistance in Paktia has been torn apart by the reluctance of some of the tribesmen to shell the town of Khost, for similar reasons. The point, I want to emphasize, is not simply that Pakistan or the ISI or the CIA or the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad or the Saudis are to blame. In the absence of institutions of command and control among the mujahedin, their supporters attempt to supply it. This is natural, even inevitable, as long as they are supplying weapons and hope to reap some political benefit from this policy. It is also inevitable that when they attempt to manage strategy and tactics they apply their own criteria, which creates nationalist resentment among those who are disfavored. Such attempts, moreover, do not address the underlying social and political reasons that the resistance lacks command and control and only aggravate internecine conflicts.

At the moment, as a tribal leader and former diplomat from Qandahar put it to me, however much the mujahedin inside Afghanistan may want to fight against Najibullah, they do not know what they are fighting for. That is the fundamental reason the resistance has not advanced militarily since the end of the Soviet withdrawal.

A Political Settlement

First, let us be clear what a political settlement is. It does not mean settling all political conflicts in Afghanistan. It means, at best, finding a transitional arrangement that will allow gradual de-escalation of the conflict, disengagement of all foreign powers in the context of neutralization and demilitarization, and the emergence of a political system within which Afghans can pursue their conflicts by means other than firing missiles at each other.

Second, I am assuming that such a political settlement, in which Afghans choose their own leaders without any conditions set by outsiders, is in the interest of the United States. We have no interest in removing Najibullah or the PDPA or in strengthening the AIG or any other resistance organization except insofar as these moves promote such a settlement. I believe that such a settlement would also be most likely to meet the interests of Pakistan by encouraging refugee repatriation and reconstruction.

Contrary to stereotypes of the fanatical, warlike tribesman, the Afghans have many traditions for the settling of disputes, including disputes involving violence and blood feuds. What makes the

current situation harder to resolve are three factors: the immense supplies of weapons and money that are available to the protagonists from foreign supporters as long as they continue to fight; the immense scale of the human casualties, with deaths estimated at nearly 10 percent of the population, or 1.5 million, which has embittered feelings far beyond the traditional range; and the introduction of ideological politics, in particular Marxism-Leninism, which in the view of many Afghans has placed the PDPA outside of Islam, whose universalism provides the framework for resolving tribal or personal disputes. The growth of revolutionary Islam also militates against traditional dispute settlement, since many of the traditional procedures turn on respect for old men of distinguished lineage who act as mediators, while the most radical Islamists reject the authority of such leaders.

These suggest the components of an evolving resolution. Measures are necessary both to reduce the level of violent confrontation and to weaken ideological polarization. Negative symmetry plus would contribute to both. It is obvious why the end of arms supplies and the withdrawal of weapons stockpiles would lower the level of violence; it would also deprive the most ideological groups of one of their principal sources of strength. It would also be extremely helpful if the PDPA, prodded by its Soviet friends, would reorganize and rename itself, shedding its monopolistic control over mass organizations and the press and mass communications, as some of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe have done. This, of course, is out of the control of the U.S. According to an April 30 press conference of Farid Mazdak, a member of the PDPA Politburo and Najibullah confidant, the PDPA intends to take some such actions over the course of the next few months.

There must also be some kind of framework for discussions among Afghans. The American attempt to "broaden" the AIG to create such a framework is no more likely to succeed than the attempt by the PDPA to preside over "national reconciliation." Nor should we look for a mediator between these "two sides." In order to weaken ideological polarization, a process of political settlement should have the form of a round table where *multiple sides* of Afghan society are represented. It should include representatives of major commanders, religious and tribal dignitaries, ethnic and religious minorities, former government officials, and former king Zahir Shah or his representative. Such a round table would have to be constituted under the aegis of a relatively neutral organization,

such as the U.N., perhaps acting in conjunction with the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This is the body which could organize the elections mentioned above or act as a weak transitional government until elections are held.

There are a number of proposals for bridging the gap over whether the PDPA should be represented there. One alternative is to include members of the current regime whom the mujahedin accept as Good Muslims. For instance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar accepts former Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai, and Ahmad Shah Massoud has met with Vice President Abdul Hamid Mohtat. Alternatively, both Najibullah and the leaders of Peshawar could be omitted from initial meetings in favor of relatively non-partisan neutrals, such as Zaher Shah or the NSS.

Finally, the round table should submit whatever proposals it makes to the approval of the Afghans through an election, a Loya Jirga, or a representative shura. Neither the Peshawar parties nor the PDPA have ever submitted themselves to the judgement of the people they claim to represent. A political settlement will begin to endure only when there is some mechanism to make Afghan leaders accountable to Afghans.

Linking all elements of such a proposal would be complex. As I suggested earlier, a joint announcement by all arms suppliers that they intend to stop further supplies by a date certain could be accompanied by a declaration that, since there is no accepted framework for politics in Afghanistan, the U.N. and the O.I.C. should undertake urgent consultations with all Afghans about the form of discussions to choose a transitional government. These powers could ask both the Kabul regime and the AIG to dissolve themselves while a caretaker regime, such as the one envisaged by U.N. Under-Secretary-General Cordovez in 1988, assumes authority (if not power). Deciding on a precise formula would require negotiations and consultations beforehand.

Such a solution would be difficult and, at best, unlikely to succeed. But the military option alone means only certain death and destruction, without any political resolution for the people of Afghanistan.

amnesty international

AFGHANISTAN

ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL UNITY PARTY

JANUARY 1989

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In June 1989 arrests were carried out by the WAD, the security police, of the founding members of the newly formed National Unity Party, an association of university lecturers, scientists and army officers which has stated its aim as being the establishment of democracy and respect for human rights in Afghanistan through peaceful means. The party's supporters have said it has sought to create an atmosphere for the peaceful transfer of power to a government elected by the people of Afghanistan, and to be committed to a campaign for civil liberties and equality between men and women.

Among the detainees are Professor Mohammed Mohsen formerly, member of the Academy of Science, Kabul University, sentenced to six years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dargwal) Dr Abdul Jalil, lecturer at the University of War, 70 years old, sentenced to two years' imprisonment; Colonel (Dargwal) Mohammed Hakim, lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences; and Abdul Gharib Khairkhah, lecturer at the School of Ideological Studies. Amnesty International does not have the names of all the detainees. Some army officers on active service were also among the reported members of the National Unity Party detained.

According to the law on political parties, any association with 500 or more members with peaceful aims and which accepts the government's official policy of national reconciliation can apply to be registered a political party. In accordance with this law, the National Unity Party reportedly undertook to compile a list of members to enclose with their application for registration. Before the list could be completed, security personnel known as agents of WAD (formerly KQAD) raided the houses of the founding members of the National Unity Party in June 1989 and arrested dozens of them. The detainees included the prisoners mentioned above. Some of the prisoners are believed to have already been tried by a special revolutionary court, probably in August 1989; their reported sentences are cited above. Amnesty International does not have other details of the trials. The procedures of the special revolutionary courts, however, fall far short of internationally established standards for a fair trial. The prisoners do not have access to a lawyer of their choice and have no right to a judicial review by a higher tribunal.

law and political science, who had been adopted as a prisoner of conscience during his previous imprisonment between 1982 and 1987, and had no direct association with the National Unity Party. He was denied sleep for four days and nights during interrogation, but was released after four weeks.

The full number of prisoners, including army officers, held in connection with the membership of the National Unity Party is not known. The prisoners are reportedly held in Pul-e Charkhi Prison in Kabul. Amnesty International believes they may be prisoners of conscience, detained solely for the exercise of their freedom of conscience and expression.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, 1 EASTON STREET, LONDON WC1X 8DJ, UNITED KINGDOM



DECLARATION OF INTENT BY NATIONAL SALVATION SOCIETY

Dear Compatriots,

For more than a decade the fire of war and bloodshed is aflame in our beloved country, Afghanistan, and every day it is increasingly intensified. Almost every day bombs, rockets, shells and bullets are falling on our cities and villages, mountains and deserts. The worst of it is that today Afghanistan has turned into a ground on which the destructive and lethal weapons from the aliens' arsenals are tested, demolishing our Fatherland and dragging its people to annihilation.

As a result of this destructive war many cities and villages, economic and social establishments, and historical and cultural institutions have been ruined, hundreds of thousands of our citizens including innocent children waltzed in dust and blood or became wounded or disabled, several millions of our citizens fled to foreign countries, living in a miserable plight, the national economy went bankrupt, and our beloved homeland has drifted to the verge of destruction.

The main reason behind all these misfortunes is the fact that the alien powers have changed our free country into an exercise board of their policies as well as a theatre of international confrontation in order to expand their political sway and economic influence. Launching deceitful propaganda and giving fatal arms and boundless financial aid to the warring sides, they add, at every moment, fuel to the flames of war.

Afghans, obviously have the right to decide their own destiny in an atmosphere void of various internal pressures and of biased external influence and interference. Herring the few, all Afghans want to lead a peaceful life, and are opposed to any state or government to be imposed on them by force or by use and threat of bayonet, cannon and tank.

At this very time, Afghans pressingly need to revive their ruined country. Men of culture, scholars, intellectuals and skilled and experienced people who have, in fact been our national asset either sought refuge abroad or faced, in one way or another, a worse fate. The phenomenon of leaving the country still continues and to fill this gap is not an easy job. What is never recoverable is the extermination of Afghan, the Afghan - your brother and my brother. We will probably reconstruct buildings, but revival of those who eternally passed away in this long and destructive conflict is impossible until the resurrection at doomsday. We had in our country good, admirable and human traditions which are about to vanish.

Dear Compatriots,

Look, what happened to the education of the country's children. We lost millions of teaching hours due to the destruction of schools in a country where the number of literates is very few. The rest of the children for whom educational facilities are available whether inside or outside the country, are educated under an alien system. Every opposing group, in our country regrettably, calls its opposite group "an enemy", antagonistic and irreconcilable, and considers it a target to be shot at. And the more so, the prevailing conditions threaten the nation to ethnic and national, territorial and linguistic disintegration.

To destroy our country and kill the Afghans, the alien powers are massively supplying lethal arms to this land already devastated, where the people badly need food, clothes, medicine and shelter and, in one word, are aspiring a peaceful day of life without fear and anxiety.

Brother Compatriots,

Have you ever imagined what will be the fate of this land and of this free people? For many long years we, a number of Afghans, have looked forward to the return of the peaceful day, waiting to see the destiny of the Afghans to be decided by the Afghans themselves without foreign interference. But regrettably we witness that with the passage of time the roots of this calamity are deepening and widening, and aliens, who have been greedily watching this land, the sacred legacy of our ancestors entrusted to us by the martyrs fallen along the path of God and homeland are trying continuously to sow the seeds of corruption and fratricide in this suffered soil and irrigate it by the blood of the nation's youth. That is why we are convinced that it is a great and unforgivable sin to still wait and witness the deplorable condition of the country. Therefore, without any fear and apprehension and only based on national interests and motivation of conscience, with full freedom and without bias or inclination to any side but simply in the spirit of benevolence, in order:

- to create an atmosphere conducive for negotiation among all the parties involved and to find a solution acceptable to the people and opposing groups;
- to pave the way for declaring a ceasefire and ensuring control over its compliance;
- to preserve the country's independence, national unity and territorial integrity;
- to stop foreign interference in the affairs belonging to our people and country;

- to secure cooperation and assistance in forming a provisional national unity government including the concerned parties, and to renew the Constitution by a Loya Jirga, genuinely representing the people;
- to cooperate in the free elections to the National Assembly and in participation of all parties;
- to contribute to the establishment of a state system based on the principles of the sacred religion of Islam, national history and culture and the exigencies of the time;
- to consolidate the policy of non-alignment and to avoid tailing after in the international politics; and finally
- to restore peace with justice in the country and to ensure the nation's pride and the rights of its citizens;

We the founding members of the National Salvation Society, relying on God, the Almighty, decided to commence our activity through our contacts with all the Afghan warring parties, political personalities and organisations, national forces inside the country, Afghan parties and groups in Pakistan, Iran and other countries, armed commanders in various areas of the country, the ex-King and his advocates in and outside Afghanistan, the Afghans living abroad urging them to find a solution to the pressing national and internal problems on the basis of negotiation, and in compliance with individual and social rights. Because in these conditions where there is no family that has not either lost a member or had a wounded, disabled or wanderer, where prices are increasingly hiked up and a big deficiency of essential commodities threaten our people, where an unprecedented inflation has subjected our national economy to bankruptcy, conditions from which our people have been severely suffering, we hold that remaining indifferent and keeping quiet is a big and unforgivable sin.

To achieve our objective, we will refer to the international community, the United Nations Organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement, Organisation of Islamic Conference, notable national and religious figures, effective and influential personalities in the neighbouring countries and national and international non-governmental organisations.

We will take to each and every humanitarian individual the voice of the oppressed and offended Afghan people who demand peace and peaceful coexistence, their civil, political, social and human rights on their soil, and will thus awaken the conscience of humanity in this regard. We will cooperate with any individual or group that would proceed from these objectives. We call the Afghans, whether outside or within the country, for this benevolent cause.

Perhaps, a limited number of individuals, who make their subsistence through fires and guns, who owe their survival to the murdering of their countrymen and who seek benefit from the war, will conspire and take a stand against us. However, since our objective is only to ensure the satisfaction of God,

observance of humanism and rights of the homeland regardless of personal gains or temporary luring fleshy life, we believe in the fact that anybody who takes a step along the welfare and prosperity of the people, the Almighty will guarantee his victory. In this we are guided by the following saying of Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon Him)

Our stand is borne out by the fact that over the past ten years we have not even been in agreement with the current policies of the time. Similarly, we have had no collaboration with those who have been opposed and hostile to the present regime.

We do not see as permissible any cooperation with any state or super-power, unless they refrain from direct and indirect intervention in the internal affairs of our country.

We urge the entire Afghans to help us materially and morally. We want the human community, whose humanistic affection and conscience are still alive, to save our nation from the verge of annihilation.

We wish all the Afghans, whose hearts beat for the love of their homeland and compatriot, to form such groups where ever they are, become united, and take their voice of righteousness ever louder to reach the human community.

Dear Compatriots,

Wherever you are, get united, join hands, forget the motives that split you, put aside previous differences in accordance with the Afghan tradition, become helpers of each other and embrace one another. Your country is living through critical and crucial moments of its history. It is only by unity and oneness, tolerance and forgiveness that we can successfully and proudly get through these delicate and complicated moments of Afghan history.

The statement was agreed upon and endorsed by the founding members of the National Salvation Society in their meeting of September 30, 1989.

No. Name:

- 1- Prof.Mohammed Asghar, former vice-president of Helmand valley development project, rector of Kabul University, Kabul city Mayor and Minister of Justice, as chairman.
- 2- Dr.Mohammed Aman, former president of Industrial Development Bank and Minister of Finance, as deputy chairman.
- 3- Ret.General Abdul Hakim Katswazi, former commander-in-chief of police force as deputy chairman.
- 4- Eng.Abdul Qudus Majid, former deputy Minister of Mines and Industries, as secretary.
- 5- Shaikh Ali Ahmad Fakoor, a spiritual figure, as secretary.
- 6- Mohammed Anwar Zisis, former Minister of finance, as member.
- 7- Ret.Col.Gen.Mohammed Azim, former Minister of Public Works, as member.
- 8- Prof.Abdul Wasai Serej, formerly lecturer at the Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.
- 9- Prof.Mohammed Anwar Arghandiwal, former Minister of Justice and lecturer at Law faculty of Kabul University, as member.
- 10- Dr.Mohammed Akbar Omar, former Minister of Commerce, as member.
- 11- Abdul Hakim, former Minister of Agriculture, as member.
- 12- Dr.Abdullah Wahidi, former rector of Kabul University and Governor of Kabul, as member.
- 13- Ret.Gen.Mir Mohammed Oamen, former vice-president of Military Court, as member.
- 14- Lal Gul Faried, former deputy in the National Assembly, as member.
- 15- Hafizullah, former president of bus enterprises, as member

20.9.1989